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Abstract 
Long-term global scenarios have underpinned research and assessment of global 
environmental change for four decades. Over the past ten years, the climate change research 
community developed a scenario framework combining alternative futures of climate and society 
to facilitate integrated research and consistent assessment to inform policy. Here we assess 
how well this framework is working and what challenges it faces. We synthesize insights from 
the scenario-based literature, community discussions, and recent experience in assessments, 
concluding that the framework has been widely adopted across research communities and is 
largely meeting immediate needs. However, some mixed successes and a changing policy and 
research landscape present key challenges and we recommend several new directions for the 
development and use of this framework.   
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Scenarios have been a key component of global change research for four decades as a means 
of characterizing uncertainty in complex interacting human and environment systems. They are 
used to explore how the future may evolve under a range of alternative conditions, or how 
desirable outcomes might be achieved and undesirable outcomes avoided. They have played 
an important role in global change research by providing a small set of common climate change 
and societal futures for use across research communities. 
 
Since 2009,1 multiple communities have collaborated on the so-called SSP-RCP framework:2–5 
a set of alternative socio-economic development pathways (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, 
SSPs) and atmospheric concentration pathways (Representative Concentration Pathways, 
RCPs) with their associated climate change outcomes (Box 1). 
 
The framework’s primary goals are: 
● to support climate change-related research globally across research communities and 
be extendable to other scales, sectors and issue areas; 
● to facilitate research that integrates climate and societal futures by providing more 
detailed socioeconomic and political conditions as inputs to studies of impacts, 
adaptation and mitigation; 
● to foster consideration of uncertainty in future climate and societal conditions by 
describing a wide range of plausible futures;  
● to encourage more coherent synthesis in scientific assessments by improving the 
consistency of climate and societal assumptions in the literature; and 
● to support research and analysis to inform policy. 
The RCPs were published in 20116 and the SSPs in 2017,7 with elements available several 
years prior. Significant experience gained since then supports a first evaluation. A Scenarios 
Forum brought together more than 300 international participants in 2019 to discuss progress on 
scenario development and use, particularly focusing on the SSP-RCP framework.8 We build on 
those discussions to evaluate successes, identify needs, and recommend a number of 
modifications and directions for future work. 
 
The SSP-RCP framework departs from previous approaches to climate change scenarios by 
developing climate and societal futures in parallel, and then combining them in integrated 
research (Box 1 Figure). Both SSPs and RCPs are therefore incomplete by design, in that the 
RCPs generate climate projections that are not interpreted as corresponding to specific societal 
pathways, while the SSPs are alternative societal futures in which no climate change impacts 
occur, nor climate policy responses are implemented. SSPs and RCPs are “completed” when 
combined and applied in individual studies, where climate risks and adaptation or mitigation 
strategies are assessed.  
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Experience with the scenario framework indicates that it has successfully facilitated substantial 
progress toward achieving its original goals.  
 
For example, the framework is supporting research across a wide range of topic areas and is 
being extended for use at a range of scales. The SSPs have been employed in more than 1380 
analyses related to climate change drivers, risks, and response options (Fig. 1). Within impacts-
related research, applications to water (including hydrologic extremes), agriculture, and health 
predominate, but smaller numbers of studies address topics as diverse as poverty, tourism, 
conflict, ecological impacts, and economic growth. More than 70 of these studies address 
multiple topics equally.  
 
The full set of SSP information is being employed, although not all elements of SSPs are used 
in every study. In many cases, studies draw on basic quantitative inputs such as population 
(>890 papers) and GDP (>780) pathways. A substantial number (>580) draw on the narratives. 
Many use the urbanization (>160) or education (>60) projections. These new types of 
quantitative information relative to what previous scenarios provided enable analyses of new 
dimensions of future exposure and vulnerability to climate hazards, such as for urban health9 or 
for agriculture.10  
 
The SSP narratives have proven useful for supporting a large number of extensions. For 
example, global narrative extensions were produced for key sectors to support quantitative 
projections from energy and land use models, and projections from integrated assessment 
models (IAMs).11,12 The IAM scenarios, in turn, have been useful for a range of applications, 
such as highlighting the role of socio-economic pathways in achieving stringent mitigation 
goals.7,13  
 
Similarly, the population and GDP information in the basic SSPs has been enhanced by 
extending it to gridded population distributions14–17 and within-country income distributions.18–20 
These extensions have helped identify the scale and spatial patterns of expected exposure to 
various climate hazards,21–24 inform spatial patterns of demand for land and other climate 
drivers, and support analyses of climate implications for poverty and the most vulnerable.20,21 
 
Additional global extensions support analyses across a wide range of sectors, including air 
pollution,25 health,26 water,27 forest management,28 and oceans.29 Extensions to support analysis 
of violent conflict30 and governance31 represent progress in topics that were previously under-
served by scenarios. For instance, in one study that found large direct impacts of climate 
change on violent conflict to be unlikely, conflict propensity varied widely between SSP1 and 
SSP3.30 Projections of the climate change adaptive capacity of political systems using 
governance indicators show that even with optimistic assumptions (SSPs 1 and 5), it may take 
three decades to develop the capacity necessary to cope with projected climate risks.31 
 
Re-submitted to Nature Climate Change 
 September 16, 2020 
4 
 
SSP extensions to regions have enabled their use across multiple time and spatial scales, 
diversifying types of users and research questions.32–35 For example, extensions of the SSPs 
were developed for Europe35 and used as context for developing SSPs for individual regions 
(Iberia, Hungary and Scotland) with local stakeholders. These regional SSPs were combined 
with downscaled climate scenarios based on two RCPs to serve as an input for a range of 
climate change impact models36 and as context for the development of adaptation and 
mitigation pathways with decision-makers.37  
 
The goal for the framework of facilitating research that integrates climate and societal futures 
also appears to be well served. In more than 700 studies, the SSPs were combined with RCPs 
to carry out integrated analysis. More than half of SSP-based studies are related to impacts, 
adaptation, and vulnerability (Fig. 1), frequently concluding that societal development and 
choices can be the most significant drivers of climate-related risks in many sectors, including 
health,9 food,38 water,39 and buildings.40 As an example, projections of indicators of risk from 
different levels of global mean temperature change and socioeconomic development show that 
the number of people vulnerable to impacts in water, energy, and land sectors is sensitive to 
both determinants.21,36 Projected global exposure to multi-sector risks approximately doubles 
between 1.5°C and 2.0°C, and doubles again with 3.0°C of warming above pre-industrial 
temperatures.21 For populations vulnerable to poverty, exposure is 8- to 32-fold greater under 
SSP3 than SSP1. 
 
Progress toward incorporating uncertainty into societal and climate futures is evidenced by the 
fact that the full range of SSPs and RCPs is being used (Fig. 2). Risks and response options are 
being investigated from high climate change outcomes (RCP8.5) to outcomes consistent with 
the Paris Agreement 1.5 C goals (RCP1.9)13, and from development pathways with high 
challenges to mitigation (SSPs 3,5) and adaptation (SSPs 3,4) to development pathways with 
low challenges to mitigation (SSPs 1,4) and adaptation (SSPs 1,5). Their use is uneven, 
however, and there are more studies based on the middle-of-the-road development pathway 
(SSP2, 30%) and climate change outcomes available from existing Earth system model 
projections (RCPs 2.6, 4.5, 6.0, 8.5 from CMIP5), especially for the highest forcing pathway 
(RCP 8.5, 29%, see Fig. 2). The balance of studies is likely to evolve over time, especially as 
new Earth system model simulations become available (CMIP6) for a fuller range of forcing 
pathways.  
 
Finally, regarding the goal of encouraging more coherent scientific assessments, the scenario 
framework has been widely used in key environmental assessment reports, including three 
IPCC special reports,41–43 the global report from the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES),44 and other global assessments.45,46 
 
For example, in the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5oC,41 the framework was 
used across the report to consider alternative pathways consistent with the 1.5°C target, leading 
to several key conclusions: that mitigation and adaptation options have many synergies with 
sustainable development; that pathways characterized by inequality, poverty, and lack of 
international cooperation may not be able to meet the goal; and that low-demand pathways 
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would reduce the reliance on energy technologies with potential negative consequences for 
food security and biodiversity.  
 
The IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land42 used SSP-based literature to 
conclude that risks related to desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity are strongly 
determined by socioeconomic conditions, and not just the level of global temperature increase. 
 
The SSPs also provided the basis for the emissions and land use scenarios currently used by 
climate models that will project climate outcomes for the IPCC’s sixth assessment report,47 and 
efforts are ongoing to coordinate the use of scenarios across the three working groups.8  
 
The IPBES global and four regional assessment reports mapped the SSP-RCP framework to a 
set of scenario archetypes to synthesize risks from climate and societal drivers on biodiversity 
and ecosystem services.48 A key conclusion from the global assessment was that risks to 
biodiversity and nature’s contributions to people were lowest under the “global sustainability” 
scenario (based on SSP1-2.6, where the second number indicates the RCP), while the 
“economic optimism” scenario (based on SSP5-8.5) resulted in the largest number of trade-offs 
between biodiversity and different contributions of nature to people.  
 
Needs and recommendations 
 
Alongside these successes, opportunities for increasing the usefulness and relevance of the 
framework were identified. We highlight the most important issues and offer recommendations 
for addressing each (summarized in Table 1). 
 
Improve integration of societal and climate conditions 
Policy- and decision-makers charged with preparing for and managing the risks of a changing 
climate need improved integrated studies that provide more targeted support for assessing 
response options. For example, few integrated studies assess resilience (the ability to cope with 
and recover from climate-related losses), and many adaptation scenario studies simply state the 
kind of adaptation actions that are assumed to occur, rather than articulating the transitions by 
which adaptation outcomes are achieved.10,49–51 In addition, while gradual changes in climate 
are important, improved information is needed on possibly unlikely but highly consequential 
changes in extreme events.  
Understanding future resilience would be improved by projections not only of traditional 
consumption-based poverty levels, but also of social protection, financial inclusion, strength of 
governance and political institutions, retirement funds, and health care access, particularly on 
sub-national scales. The development of adaptation transitions would be supported by 
extending the SSPs to include quantified indicators of vulnerability and resilience, and 
consideration of the potential for societal tipping points that might hasten, or impede, 
transitions.52 Initial progress on projections of governance31 and violent conflict30 should be 
broadened to include political institutions and integrated into the SSPs.  
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To improve the consideration of extreme events, narrative descriptions of future climate events 
or trends could be added to scenarios that focus on low likelihood but potentially high-risk 
outcomes for society. This “physical climate storyline” approach53,54 describes how the impact of 
current weather events may change in the future due to unprecedented combinations of climate 
and societal conditions,55 helping to understand complex interactions between the physical, 
ecological, economic and societal aspects of extreme or compound events.56 Physical climate 
storylines can be usefully combined with the SSP-RCP framework as part of downscaling to 
regional and local scales.57  
Information on climate and societal conditions is needed at scales relevant for decision-making. 
To address this need, downscaled climate projections at regional and local scales58 should be 
made more consistent with projected societal trends. For example, given the implications of land 
use change for regional climate, and variations in land use across SSPs, some regional 
activities are already planning SSP-specific downscaling of climate change outcomes; more 
should be pursued. Furthermore, there are added complexities involved in specifying consistent 
future conditions for considering impacts locally that propagate across borders or other 
socioeconomic domains. 59  
Finally, when integrating climate and societal futures, the plausibility of particular combinations 
should be carefully considered. A number of models found that the radiative forcing levels in 
RCP8.5 can be achieved only by SSP5,7 and that the forcing levels in RCPs 1.9 and 2.6 are not 
achievable under SSP3.13 Figure 2 indicates that many studies employed SSP-RCP 
combinations that may therefore be considered unlikely. Often these studies use scenario 
information in limited ways that lessen concerns about inconsistency, such as focusing on short-
term outcomes,60 single elements of the SSPs (such as GDP or population growth), or use 
SSPs as sensitivity analyses. In other cases, greater care in combining assumptions will 
improve the relevance of results. It may be useful to develop indicators of consistency with the 
SSP-RCP framework that can be used in assessing the literature.  
Improve applicability to regional and local scales  
SSP applications to regional and local scales have generated a growing diversity of 
perspectives, methods, and users, including practitioners working in climate adaptation, 
community resilience, and sustainable development. A current challenge is how to maintain 
consistency across the growing richness of multi-scale SSP scenarios in terms of 
socioeconomic assumptions and trajectories.61,62 Such consistency ultimately helps to increase 
the validity of global and regional SSP applications, and it is particularly desirable when 
comparing, combining, or upscaling regional applications of the SSPs.  
At present there is no commonly agreed best practice regarding methods for downscaling the 
global SSPs. Rather, alternative methods and experiments have emerged organically in a 
relatively ad-hoc manner. For example, scenarios have been developed locally in a participatory 
manner and then mapped to, or contextualized with, the global SSPs.63–65 Alternatively, the 
SSPs have been used to stress test bottom up, normative scenarios and strategies.66 While 
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such studies reflect the flexibility of the SSP framework, that flexibility also hinders the 
development of reproducible approaches to downscaling.  
What is now needed are credible, reproducible, and consistent methods for the use of the SSPs 
across scales to pursue new questions and needs. We recommend three actions. First, a more 
diverse set of global SSPs should be developed to enable the exploration of a broader set of 
boundary conditions for multi-scale analyses (see “capture relevant perspectives” below for 
examples). This could include development of SSP variants or the mapping of other scenarios 
or scenario families to the SSP framework based on common affinities or archetypes.67,68 
Second, community consensus should be developed around methods for working with the SSPs 
across scales. Convening researchers to learn from and evaluate the pool of approaches to 
develop more refined methods would be productive. Third, the development of sanctioned 
regional scenarios would facilitate consistency across different research endeavors and 
organizations. For example, for the Fourth U.S. National Climate Assessment,69 a set of 
scenario products was developed based on the RCPs and SSPs to promote consistent use of 
scenario assumptions across sectoral and regional aspects of the assessment. 
Improve relevance beyond the climate research community  
 
Application of the scenarios framework to research domains beyond climate change has been 
limited, partly due to lack of relevant content. For example, the SSP-RCP scenarios were used 
in the IPBES Global Assessment but were found to lack information on the relationship between 
nature and people.69 IPBES is therefore currently developing its own Natures Futures 
Framework.70 Similarly, the World in 2050 (TWI2050),45 a community initiative on the SDGs, 
used SSP1 (sustainability) as a starting point for its assessment but found no scenarios that 
were able to achieve all the SDGs simultaneously.  
 
Broader use of the SSP-RCP framework would increase comparability of assessments across 
issues and help develop a more comprehensive view of possible integrated futures and 
response options. Four recommendations would facilitate this wider use. First, the SSPs should 
be mapped to assumptions about key drivers of economic, environmental, and societal 
sustainability.71 Second, the SSP narratives need to be extended to be able to inform analyses 
of how to meet key international societal and environmental goals beyond the Paris Agreement, 
such as those embodied in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. These extensions should incorporate narratives relating to such targets, 
conditions under which synergies or trade-offs across policy domains would dominate, and 
information on barriers or enabling conditions such as the quality of governance and political 
institutions.  
 
Third, parallel scenario activities such as the IPBES, TWI2050, and the SSPs should be 
connected by mapping scenarios onto each other, using scenario archetypes.72 Where key 
disconnects are identified, SSPs should be broadened to cover a wider range of worldviews or 
perspectives (e.g. scenarios where all the SDGs are met). Fourth, guidance materials and 
online repositories are needed to foster interdisciplinary collaboration, learning and capacity 
building on scenarios across research communities. There is a particular need for social 
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sciences to inform scenarios on societal dynamics and tipping points. In turn, social scientists 
should be aware that engaging with scenarios advances theory-building and generalization in 
their own disciplines 
 
Produce a broader range of reference scenarios that include impacts and policy 
 
A typical approach to model-based scenario analysis is to estimate the effects of introducing a 
feature of interest by comparing the results of two scenarios: a reference scenario that does not 
include the feature, and an alternative scenario that does. The feature of interest can be a policy 
(mitigation or adaptation), an alternative assumption about a driver (e.g., population growth, 
effectiveness of governance), or a climate change impact (e.g., climate effects on crop yield). 
 
The scenarios framework highlights five scenarios as reference cases (sometimes referred to as 
baseline scenarios): the no-policy and no-climate-impacts reference scenarios represented by 
the five SSPs. Yet there are a growing number of studies that require reference scenarios that 
include policies and/or impacts. These types of reference scenarios are useful when studying 
issues beyond climate change, including the relationship between climate change and 
sustainable development or air quality. They are also useful within climate research when 
studying impacts or policies in relation to other impacts or policies. That includes, for example, 
studies of climate policies beyond those currently implemented that require comparing to a 
reference scenario  of current policy trends. It also includes studies of particular impacts, such 
as conflict, that depend on a reference scenario representing other impacts, such as food and 
water security, that may co-determine the outcome of interest. Similarly, analyses of the costs 
and benefits of mitigation or adaptation policies require comparing climate change impacts with 
and without the implementation of mitigation policies. In addition, although no-policy and no-
climate-impact reference scenarios have an important role in the scenario framework design 
(Box 1), stakeholders often find them unrealistic, which can hinder participatory scenario 
studies, policy dialogues, and public acceptance. 
 
We recommend producing a broader range of integrated reference scenarios within the existing 
scenarios framework. The broader set would include new “policy reference scenarios” based on 
current policy trends or assuming moderate levels of climate action.73 A starting point is 
provided by individual studies that have begun developing new reference scenarios that, for 
example, extrapolate implemented and planned national climate policies into the future, or that 
achieve the Paris Agreement’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to emissions 
reductions.74 Such reference scenarios can be defined by combinations of SSPs and a set of 
shared reference policy assumptions (reference SPAs) in the SSP-RCP framework (see Box 2).  
 
It would also include reference scenarios with climate impacts based on a subset of existing 
SSP-RCP scenarios. A number of questions need to be addressed about how to develop such 
scenarios, including which impacts to include, how to represent uncertainty in outcomes, and 
how both policies and impacts could be most effectively combined. It would also be crucial that 
the purpose of such reference scenarios be clearly labelled, to preclude their adoption in 
analyses that lead to possible double counting of impact outcomes.  
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Integrated reference scenarios may also be critical to extend the application of the SSP-RCP 
framework to sustainable development research. We recommend conducting research on the 
characteristics of useful reference scenarios for the analysis of sustainable development 
pathways and how they could be connected to the existing scenario framework.75 The 
distinction between SSPs (including development aspects and policies, but no climate policies) 
and SPAs (including only climate policies) will become less useful in a sustainable development 
context. There is a need to identify SSP-SPA combinations that are tailored to the analysis of 
sustainable development policies.  
      
Capture relevant perspectives and uncertainties  
 
The scenario framework aims to capture a wide range of uncertainties and a broad set of 
perspectives with a manageable number of alternative futures. It is important  to 
comprehensively cover futures that would be most relevant for societies to consider while 
excluding those that do not merit broad use. Relevant scenarios  explore a range of plausible 
but widely different societal futures as well as futures considered desirable by some societal 
actors. For example, futures with no or limited growth in high-income countries or scenarios 
oriented around eco-communalism76 are not represented in the SSPs. Plausible futures that 
may be under-represented include those driven by disruptive events (Box 3), whether 
technological, social, political or environmental. For example it may be useful to explore the 
implications of violent conflicts,77 the crossing of biophysical and social tipping points, or 
unexpectedly rapid technological innovation, e.g. in artificial intelligence or energy efficiency.78  
Addressing these issues will require careful attention to the process of choosing and developing 
new scenarios as well as to the range of plausible futures covered by existing scenarios. We 
recommend a continuous re-evaluation of the current range of uncertainties in SSPs, RCPs, 
and their combinations. As trends in society, economy, energy systems, land use, and 
emissions evolve over time, it is important to periodically check whether the range 
encompassed by the framework is too wide in some areas or too narrow in others. This process 
should involve assessing the potential for high emissions futures, including re-examining the 
assumptions underlying SSP5-8.5 (the highest forcing scenario in the current framework) in light 
of recent trends in energy systems. It should also involve further assessment of the plausibility 
of low emissions futures and the mitigation measures that might achieve them. Many IAM 
scenarios limiting warming to 1.5-2°C make extensive use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) 
technologies and bioenergy, approaches with potentially significant risks for ecosystems and 
agriculture. In response to criticism about this reliance on CDR, scenario research is exploring a 
variety of alternative mitigation strategies78,79 that explicitly limit CDR and carbon capture and 
storage technologies. It is important to continue to analyze alternative scenarios capturing a 
range of fundamentally different perspectives on technology and consumption futures, including 
nature-based solutions, deep lifestyle changes, circular economy, and techno-fixes like solar 
radiation management. 
We also recommend that the process of scenario development be as inclusive as possible to 
capture a diverse set of perspectives from different parts of the world and different societal 
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groups. Inclusiveness can be fostered by making the framework and related scenario products 
more widely known and accessible and by expanding participation through regional workshops 
and applications. Scenario products themselves should include greater regional heterogeneity, 
especially in developing country regions, to better represent diverse perspectives and 
conditions.   
A more inclusive process would also improve the relevance and credibility of the scenarios to a 
wider range of researchers, users, and stakeholders. The legitimacy80 of the choice of scenarios 
engendered by such a process is critical for scenario applications because they structure 
discourse and could generate self-fulfilling prophecies.81 Pitfalls can be avoided by approaching 
the science-society interface in an iterative way to co-produce societally relevant and legitimate 
knowledge.82,83 Critical reflection on implicit assumptions about the perspectives of decision 
makers could improve the relevance of scenarios to a wider set of communities and 
cultures.84,85 "Layered methods"86,87 could be used to expand the cultural breadth of climate 
change-related scenarios. 
Exploring methods that move beyond the traditional two-axis scenario archetype to a richer and 
more systematically grounded set of scenarios might improve confidence in having a sufficiently 
wide and diverse scenario set. These methods can include scenario discovery approaches88,89 
and semi-quantitative techniques for constructing scenarios that achieve specified goals, such 
as consistency, diversity, or resilience.90 
Keep scenarios up to date  
The scenarios framework was designed to support research over a sustained period of time. 
However, inconsistencies can develop between the framework and changing societal 
conditions, advancing knowledge, and an evolving policy landscape. For example, the starting 
year of the quantitative drivers of the SSPs was 2010 (and for emissions was 2015), in some 
cases based on data from an earlier point in time. Updated data on national level GDP, fertility 
and mortality rates, and urbanization are available, and outlooks for near-term trends in energy 
systems and emissions have  changed over time.  
 
Updating the framework with recent data and trends will improve its perceived validity and 
suitability for research applications, especially those focused on near-term issues such as 
attainment of the NDCs. However, there is an inherent tension between revisions and providing 
a stable set of scenario information that promotes consistency in assumptions across the 
scientific literature. The COVID-19 crisis is a further complication, given the large uncertainty 
surrounding short-term recovery rates and their long-term implications (Box 3).  
 
We recommend establishing a process for regular updates of the SSPs, and the emissions and 
land use scenarios based on them, that balances stability and keeping up to date. Some 
elements of the framework have a higher priority for more frequent updates than others. 
Quantitative drivers, and the IAM scenarios based on them, should be updated frequently (at 
least every five years), with a focus on base year data and near-term trends. We recommend 
that drivers be updated now to be consistent with new historical data. At the same time, 
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individual IAM studies might explore implications of these updates and alternative possible 
COVID-19 futures. New community IAM scenarios that are part of the scenario framework and 
include the effects of the pandemic could be developed after the initial uncertainty about the 
pandemic’s consequences lessens.  
The overall narratives and framework could be more stable. As broader, qualitative descriptions 
of long-term alternative futures, they are less susceptible to changing conditions in the near 
term and would likely be modified, or new narratives added, for reasons of clarification or to 
represent new types of societal futures that become relevant to research or policy (see “Capture 
relevant perspectives”).  
 
RCPs are currently updated on a schedule dictated by the pace of climate model development 
and scientific climate assessments. If SSPs are updated more frequently than RCPs, as we 
propose, there will be inconsistencies between the latest version of the SSPs (and emissions 
and land use scenarios based on them) and the versions used to drive RCP simulations. 
However, these inconsistencies are unlikely to be large enough to make the combined use of 
RCPs and SSPs invalid, especially for lower RCPs that strongly constrain emissions scenarios 
to meet forcing targets. Clear versioning of SSPs and RCPs will improve transparency about 
which sets of assumptions are being used in a particular study. 
 
Improve relevance of climate change scenario applications for users 
 
The number of users of climate change scenario information has increased substantially over 
recent years, but the availability of information tailored to specific needs has not kept pace.91 
Users now extend beyond policy-makers and planning authorities to include businesses looking 
to evaluate the alignment of investment decisions with the Paris climate goals and the finance 
sector, which has become increasingly interested in assessing climate-related financial risk.92,93 
Subnational actors (e.g. cities) and civil society are also turning to scenarios to help inform their 
climate resilience strategies.94 
To meet these increasingly diverse needs, we propose creation of "climate change scenario 
services" analogous to the rapidly developing area of "climate services"95 that brings climate 
change projections to users. First, capacity building is needed to allow users to better 
understand climate change scenario approaches and the SSP-RCP framework. Second, 
communication of scenario results should be improved through novel approaches including 
infographics, cartoons or illustrations of simplified system dynamics, climate or integrated 
assessment models (e.g., climatescenarios.org). Third, easy access to climate change scenario 
products should be provided for example through portals tailored to user needs and capabilities. 
It would be particularly useful to develop a user-friendly online database containing all relevant 
information about the SSP-RCP scenarios, including narratives, extensions, variants, and 
downscaling products. Fourth, stakeholders should be involved in the co-production of scenario 
knowledge to improve its usefulness and create ownership.  
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The climate change scenarios framework, like previous generations of scenarios and those 
developed for other research communities, is intended to benefit an array of researchers, users, 
and assessment processes. To ensure the framework’s ongoing value, the scenarios 
community should not only learn from the successes, shortcomings, and ongoing challenges, 
but also act on those lessons. The 20 proposed recommendations (table 1) provide a starting 
point for such actions. They include modifications to the current framework, improvements to the 
scenario development process, ways to better connect to users and other research 
communities, and new research to be carried out to investigate open questions.  
 
Over time, further aspects of the framework will need to be considered. There are inherent 
tensions in fostering both the use of common assumptions and the application to a wide 
diversity of sectors, regions, and stakeholders. The approach of distinguishing “basic” and 
“extended” SSPs for this purpose will have to be revisited over time. Likewise, the specification 
of mitigation scenarios through the use of RCPs based on radiative forcing is not always 
consistent with the desire to evaluate outcomes associated with peak or long-term average 
global warming levels.96 Investigating alternative framings would be desirable. 
 
To foster and track progress, and revise goals as experience accumulates, the Scenarios 
Forum is intended to become a regular biennial event,8 with researchers communicating in the 
meantime via a dedicated organization (www.iconics-ssps.org) for maintaining close ties across 
relevant research communities. Wide participation in the development, use, and continuous re-
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BOX 1: The SSP-RCP scenarios framework 
 
The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) and Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs) describe alternative visions of how society and climate may evolve over the coming 
decades, providing a framework for combining these pathways in integrated studies (Figure 1).3 
 
The SSPs include societal factors such as demographics, human development (e.g., health, 
education), economic growth, inequality, governance, technological change, and policy 
orientations.4,97 Most factors are given as narratives that sketch broad patterns of change 
globally and for large world regions.71 A subset (population,98 GDP,99–101 urbanization,102 and 
educational attainment98) are provided as quantitative, country-specific projections. These 
variables were chosen based on their common use as inputs to emissions or impact models, 
and their relationships to each other. Education, for example, was used in projecting both 
population and GDP. These “basic” SSPs provide core information to promote consistency 
across scenario-based studies, while extensions to finer scales and sectors were encouraged to 
expand the utility of the framework to a wider range of applications. 
 
Five SSPs were developed to span a range of outcomes for two characteristics of society: the 
challenges that the underlying factors in each pathway present to adapting to climate change, 
and the challenges they present to mitigating climate change.4,97 The SSPs do not include 
mitigation and adaptation responses themselves, nor do they include the impacts of climate 
change. This design choice was made so that integrated studies can assess the effects of 
policies or magnitude of impacts included in their own studies by comparing outcomes to those 
in the SSPs. This approach allows the SSPs to be used as a reference case for a large number 
of studies investigating a variety of policies and projected risks.  
 
Motivated by the fact that a wide variety of approaches to mitigation or adaptation policy are 
possible, Shared Policy Assumptions (SPAs) were developed that describe a smaller number of 
broad approaches to these policies.5,7 Along with other policy assumptions, like radiative forcing 
or global warming targets, SPAs are intended to foster common approaches across studies and 
support more robust assessment of the mitigation and adaptation literature (Box 2).  
 
Quantitative projections of energy use, emissions, and land use based on the SSPs and SPAs 
were produced using integrated assessment models (IAMs).7 SSP-based emission scenarios 
that do not include mitigation policy result in greenhouse gas concentrations by 2100 that are at 
the high end of the range covered by the RCPs (discussed below). However, each SSP can be 
made consistent with lower levels of radiative forcing by adding assumptions about mitigation 
policy. The mitigation necessary to achieve a given forcing outcome in each SSP will differ 
according to its challenges to mitigation.  
 
A selection of SSP-based IAM scenarios were used to drive Earth system models to project 
future climate change.47,103 This new generation of climate projections is beginning to become 
available. However, integration of climate and societal futures did not need to wait for these 
SSP-based climate projections. Hundreds of studies have already combined the societal futures 
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depicted in the SSPs with climate projections based on the RCPs. The RCPs are pathways of 
greenhouse gas concentrations over time that were based on emissions scenarios that pre-
dated the SSPs (Figure 1),6 and a first generation of climate model simulations already 
produced climate outcomes projected to result from the RCPs.104 Using the SSPs and RCPs 
together is not inconsistent because it has been well established that many different societal 
pathways can produce approximately the same radiative forcing and climate change 
outcomes.72 The SSP-based climate projections will serve to update and extend the original 
RCPs.  
 
End Box 1 
 
Box 2: Improving policy research with Shared Policy Assumptions 
 
Policy research is facing a growing challenge: the literature is uncoordinated, investigating a 
wide variety of policies with few assumptions in common across studies. As a result, it is difficult 
to draw robust conclusions about specific policy approaches. 
 
To address this challenge and improve the robustness of policy conclusions, we recommend 
further development and wider application of Shared Climate Policy Assumptions (SPAs). SPAs 
are an integral component of the scenarios framework (Box 1) describing key characteristics of 
mitigation and adaptation policies at the global scale, such as instruments and implementation 
obstacles, that are not included in the RCPs or SSPs.5 They are motivated by the aim of 
fostering common assumptions across a large number of studies to provide structure to the 
policy literature and allow for stronger conclusions about important policy issues to be drawn. 
An initial set of mitigation SPAs generated SSP-based mitigation scenarios that lead to a wide 
range of climate outcomes.7 These SPAs specified the degree of climate policy coordination 
between sectors and regions and how it could evolve over time. They were an important factor 
for the achievability of low warming targets in the SSP-RCP scenario framework.7,13 
 
With more widespread adoption of climate policy plans around the world, the use of shared 
policy assumptions in mitigation pathway research can increasingly be coupled to actual climate 
policy developments. New SPAs could be developed for wide community use, including for the 
policy component of proposed new reference scenarios (see main text). These SPAs would aim 
to address specific policy issues, such as achieving the Paris Agreement goals or the 
implications of current or planned climate policies.74 A continuous identification of new SPAs for 
policy scenarios would help the scenario framework to stay up-to-date with the rapidly evolving 
policy landscape and thus keep it relevant for policy research. 
 
The use of SPAs has been particularly limited for adaptation. Sharing common adaptation 
assumptions is challenging because adaptation policies are highly context dependent, typically 
developed at a regional level, and often co-produced with regional stakeholders.105 
Nonetheless, a concerted effort to develop regionally-differentiated adaptation SPAs could help 
structure learning about alternative approaches to adaptation. For example, a set of four 
Re-submitted to Nature Climate Change 
 September 16, 2020 
15 
 
alternative SPAs for adaptation in river deltas in Africa and Asia helped explore the 
effectiveness of alternative response options across climate and societal futures.65 
 
End Box 2 
 
Box 3: Scenarios and COVID-19 
 
Global shocks such as pandemics, technological breakthroughs, economic crises, and other 
natural or human-made disruptions (so-called “wildcards”) are irregular but expected features of 
socioeconomic development and therefore of scenarios. Some scenarios explicitly introduce 
such features,106 while in others, including the SSP-RCP framework, they are implicit 
possibilities within narratives that sketch broader changes in society without specifying causal 
events.  
 
The implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the SSPs will depend on which of three possible 
types of consequences it has on societies worldwide. First, it may have primarily short-term 
impacts, with a V-shaped recovery, at least at a global, aggregate level. For example, if 
reductions in emissions in the first several months of the pandemic fade over the following 
months, global carbon dioxide emissions in 2020 would decline only 4-7% from the previous 
year,107 with little long-term effect on global surface temperature. 108,109 The Great Recession of 
2008 had a similarly temporary effect on global emissions. Viewed on a century timescale, even 
such potentially transformational wildcard events as the breakup of the Soviet Union and its 
associated geopolitical realignment had only a transitory impact on global economic growth. 
 
The second possibility is that the indirect effects of the pandemic, have longer-term 
consequences that positively or negatively modifies the current development path but does not 
fundamentally change it. If the new development trajectory remains within the wide range of 
pathways already captured by the SSPs, modifications to the framework will not be necessary. 
For example, the pandemic could lead to a persistent reduction in economic growth rates (an L-
shaped recovery), exacerbated inequalities, and increased societal and political conflict. The 
very different responses by countries around the world could accelerate global power shifts and 
deepen inequalities across countries. Such consequences would move the world toward SSP4, 
characterized by a small number of globally connected elites with access to basic services and 
increasing numbers of poor and marginalized people who struggle with hunger and 
unemployment. Alternatively, the pandemic could trigger investments in health and education, 
lead to efforts to reduce inequality, increase investments in fair digitalization, reduce travel and 
use of fossil fuels, and reduce environmental impacts. Consequences like these could shift the 
development pathway toward SSP1. 
 
A third possibility is that COVID-19 contributes to the crossing of a tipping point in human and 
natural systems, shifting development pathways to a fundamentally new trajectory.110 The 
inequalities highlighted by the pandemic may be a route to such transformational change. 
Societal resistance, whether peaceful or violent, has been common during periods with high 
levels of inequalities.111 Societal conflicts were the starting point of most great transformations; 
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structural changes resulted in new policies and programs to increase societal equity and 
improve development pathways.112 In this way disruptions can lead to discontinuities in 
development pathways.113 Whether such an outcome would require changes to the SSP 
framework is less clear, because even some transformational changes might remain within the 
very wide range of challenges to mitigation and adaptation spanned by the SSPs. A broader 
research program could explore the SSP space beyond the current narratives by, for example, 
identifying “weak signals” of currently niche phenomena that could dominate in an alternative 
future.114  
 
A recent SSP-based stakeholder exercise, held after the start of the pandemic, illustrates the 
framework’s continuing relevance. In May 2020, stakeholders from academia, policy, practice 
and business downscaled and enriched versions of the SSPs for the UK and its countries.115 
The SSP framework was deemed sufficiently flexible to enable participants to frame the issues 
that COVID-19 raised. For instance, one key element considered was “Response to global 
shocks”, framed between the extremes of “persistence” and “transformative change”, while a 
second element was “Health”, framed in terms of low vs. high investment. Stakeholders 
included COVID-19-related concerns into the development of the UK-SSPs. 
 
The SSP-RCP framework continues to be relevant and is consistent with wild card events, but 
monitoring the consequences of COVID-19 and ensuring that scenarios continue to be flexible 
to account for future shocks will be important for deciding if and when revisions are necessary. 
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Figure 1: Application of SSPs by primary topic of analysis. Areas of rectangles are proportional 
to the number of studies in each category. Colors represent applications of SSPs (blue shades), 
scenario methods (light gray), and extensions of SSP information (dark gray). Applications 
include those primarily on climate impacts or adaptation (medium blue), drivers or mitigation 
(light blue), or address multiple topics equally (dark blue), Results based on 1378 analyses 
published 2014-2019 that use or develop SSPs and in many cases apply RCPs as well. We 
exclude papers that use RCPs only. See Supplementary Information for methods and definitions 
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Figure 2: Numbers of applications of SSP-RCP combinations in 715 total studies applying 
integrated scenarios, published over the period 2014-2019. White cells indicate no applications. 
Green rectangles along the right side of the figure indicate totals for each RCP (rows); those 
along the bottom of the figure indicate totals for each SSP (columns). Unlikely SSP-RCP 
combinations indicate those in which integrated assessment models found the outcomes 
infeasible under the SSPs and SPAs assumed.7,13 See Supplementary Information for methods 
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Box 1 Figure: The scenarios framework and process for producing integrated studies combining 
future climate outcomes, societal conditions, and policy assumptions. A more detailed version of 
this figure separating successive generations of concentration pathways, climate model 
simulations, and integrated studies is available in the supplementary information. 
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Table 1: Summary of recommendations for improving the SSP-RCP framework and the issues 
each would benefit. Shaded cells indicate recommendations made to address the issue in the 
indicated column. Check marks in unshaded cells indicate benefits of the recommended action 
to additional issues. 
 
 
































































































































































Modify Current Framework 
       
Extend SSPs to include additional quantified indicators of vulnerability and 
resilience    
    
Integrate physical climate storylines into framework 
  
          




   
Extend the SSP narratives to cover key international societal and 
environmental goals, such as the SDGs and CBD targets 
    
   
    
Improve Scenario Development Process 
       
Connect the SSP-RCP framework to parallel scenario activities using scenario 
archetypes 
    
   
    




   
Make scenario development process as inclusive as possible   
    
  
 





Connect to Users and other Research Communities 
       











Raise awareness of the relevance of the SSPs to societal objectives beyond 
climate change by widely demonstrating how they can be restructured on 
alternative axes 
  
   
  
Develop guidance materials and online repositories to foster interdisciplinary 
collaboration and capacity building     
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Create “climate change scenario services” to cater to needs of users  




       
Develop improved regional climate information 
  
        
 






    
Consider how scenarios can best account for future shocks   
   
 
 
Develop new reference scenarios including relevant climate policies and 
impacts   
  
 
      
Better understand needs for sustainable development policy analysis     
  
      
Evaluate uncertainty range covered by framework and possible missing futures     
   
    
Consider alternative methods, techniques, and processes to cover relevant 
futures and ensure legitimacy 
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